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This article applies developmental state analysis to the Irish tourism industry between
1987 and 2007 and argues that the state generates growth by constructing institutions
around the development project. Combining in-depth interviews of key players with
extensive documentary analysis, the case study found that the relationship between
state institutions and private sector coalitions was central to the development of the
industry. These relationships were explained through the concept of interlocking
regimes whereby regimes are constituted through the dimensions of power
arrangements, policy paradigms, organisations and policy. The implementation of a
development model is shaped by the extent to which a coalition and a state regime
interlock to impose that model. This occurs when regimes interact strategically
through some or all of the dimensions of both regimes. In the Irish case, the research
found that new organisational alliances within the private sector disturbed the power
arrangements underpinning the status quo. A new interlock between the state and the
business class led to regime change and the display of authority by political leaders
played a significant role in establishing a new regime with a new policy paradigm
and goals for the sector, which facilitated the phenomenal growth of the sector.
Keywords: development state; politics and tourism; policy implementation;
interlocking regimes; institutions; policy-making
Introduction
In recent decades, states have become increasingly engaged with tourism as a means of
achieving economic development (Edgell, 1999; Hall, 1994, 1998, 2000) and academic
debate has become more focused on the political aspects of this issue (Elliot, 1997; Hall,
1999; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins, 1999, 2001; Ritcher, 1983, 1994; William & Shaw,
1998). However, the political features of the state’s involvement with tourism development
have not yet been fully explored within the literature. Analysts have closely examined
political matters such as the policy-making process, policy networks and interest groups
impacts on governments’ roles in development (Anastasiadou, 2008; Butler, Hall, &
Jenkins, 1998; Edgell, DelMastro Allen, Smith, & Swanson, 2008; Pforr, 2005, 2008;
Treuren & Lane, 2003; Tyler & Dinan, 2001). But they have not yet exhaustively examined
the broader issue of the complex institutional politics that underpin the state’s involvement
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in tourism policy creation aswell as implementation. This article aims to address this issue by
applying developmental state analysis to the tourism industry. This latter perspective argues
that the state generates growth by constructing institutions around the development project.
More specifically, it proposes that two linked features of the state underpin institutional
capacity, a degree of bureaucratic autonomy and institutional links across public and
private sectors (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982). It is this key insight that the article will
examine in relation to the Irish tourism industry between 1987 and 2007. Combining in-
depth interviews of key players with extensive documentary analysis, the case study
found that the relationship between state institutions and private sector coalitions was
central to the development of Irish tourism. These relationships were explained through
the concept of interlocking regimes. Regimes are constituted in four dimensions (Wilson,
2000), power arrangements, policy paradigms, organisations and policy, within both the
private sector and the state institutions involved in the development project. The implemen-
tation of a development model is shaped by the extent to which a coalition regime and a state
institutional regime interlocked to impose that model. Interlock occurs when a political
coalition’s regime interacts strategically with a state institutional regime, or vice versa,
through some or all of the dimensions of both regimes. In the Irish case, the research
found that new organisational alliances within the private sector disturbed the power arrange-
ments underpinning the status quo. A new interlock between the state and the business class
led to regime change and the display of authority by political leaders played a significant role
in establishing a new regime with a new policy paradigm and goals for the sector.
In outlining this argument the key contributions made by the study are: firstly, it moves
beyond examining government roles in the policy-making process, instead the study exam-
ines the nature of state and private sector interactions which underpin policy creation but
also vitally, policy implementation; secondly, it challenges the classic presentation of the
Irish tourism ‘boom’ which proposes that it was achieved because of the liberalisation of
air access between Ireland and the UK and, as Deegan and Dineen (2000, p. 163) put it,
‘through a benign combination of good luck, favourable external and internal conditions
and supportive government policies aided by resource transfers from the European
Union’. Undoubtedly, the liberalisation of airfares, government support and EU structural
funds were all vital components that generated growth, but a key point nonetheless remains
that these factors were all politically mediated, for better or worse, by the Irish state, and
the state’s role in both promoting and preventing development opportunities for tourism
needs to be acknowledged and explored in more detail. Thirdly, the study presents new
elements to theoretical accounts of the politics of developmental change. These latter inno-
vations include the use of the interlocking regime as a means of conceptualising the state,
the private sector and their interactions, which rejects the tendency in the tourism and devel-
opment literatures to treat these variables as objective or fixed entities. Finally, the research
points to a gap in the existing work of developmental state theorists, which is to incorporate
further examinations of tourism development in the range of subjects for analysis.
Development and the tourism literature
‘The mainstream of tourism research has either ignored or neglected the political dimension
of the allocation of tourism resources, the generation of tourism policy, and the politics of
tourism development’ (Hall, 1994, pp. 2–7). Perhaps in response to this challenge in the
early 1990s, some tourism analysts have in recent years examined the political economy
of tourism and its development more closely (Dredge, 2001; Dredge & Jenkins, 2007;
Hall, 1998, 2000; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Jenkins & Hall, 1997). This analysis has been
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conducted in part through studies of individual countries’ tourism development policies
(Chambers & Airey, 2001; Kerr, 2003; Wong, Bauer, & Wong, 2008). For instance,
Deegan and Dineen (1997, 2000, 2003) have examined the historical evolution of policy
in Ireland and the ‘organizational factors and the policy instruments applied to develop
the sector’, which were analyzed ‘against the background of changing international
demand trends & EU government support for investment in the industry’ (1997, p. 6).
Other analysts examine tourism development more broadly in terms of the evolution of
the policy-making process (Anastasiadou, 2008; Edgell et al., 2008; Michael, 2001;
Pforr, 2005; Treuren & Lane, 2003; Tyler & Dinan, 2001). In this vein, Michael (2001)
and Edgell et al. (2008) advocate the use of public choice theory (Buchannan & Tullock,
1962) as a mechanism for understanding the relationships of bureaucrats and special inter-
est groups in policy-making. Public choice theory proposes that political decisions are
made, not in the public interest, but rather in the best interests of those making them
(Edgell et al., 2008, pp. 263–264). Edgell et al. further elaborate that bureaucrats are motiv-
ated by achieving the mission of their agency and rely on special interest groups to influence
the legislature, which leads to the potential for bureaucrats to be captured by interest groups
(p. 264).
While public choice theory recognises the roles of the state and private sector in tourism
policy-making, it underspecifies the exact manner in which these agencies engage to gen-
erate development. An alternative examination of that relationship is offered by Hall (2008,
p. 165) who notes that the state often acts in public–private partnerships, which may
promote greater efficiency and cooperation in achieving economic goals, but may alterna-
tively act to narrow policy perspectives and to limit the role of stakeholders to that of indus-
try rather than community. Davis, Wanna, Warhurst and Weller (1993) note that partnership
is used because it reduces the dependency of public enterprises on public budgets, reduces
public debt by selling state assets and increases efficiencies through commercialisation. But
Dredge and Jenkins (2007, p. 144) note that ‘governments have yielded to the private sector
too much discretion for making decisions that affect the public interest’. Treuren and Lane
(2003) further extend the partnership approach to propose that tourism planning is a process
that occurs within and between three locations, the individual tourism organisation, the
industry and within the state. However, more recent analyses have suggested a need to
be more ‘encompassing and discriminating’ in describing the policy process, and analysts
have moved away from overly schematic analysis of the policy ‘structure’ to explore in
more detail the ‘complex, diffuse and non-rational nature of the policy process’ as well
as the multiplicity of actors involved, through studies of tourism policy networks (Pforr,
2005, p. 334).
These studies refer to actors and relationships in the policy process that suggest the pres-
ence of many communities and different types of networks in tourism development
(Atkinson & Coleman, 1989, p. 154). Policy networks are understood as power dependency
relationships, which exist between government and interest groups, in which resources are
exchanged (Bo¨rzel, 1997, p. 2). Tyler and Dinan (2001) propose that within networks, inter-
ested groups try to influence government policy at the interface between producer groups,
countervailing groups and autonomous state agencies (2001, p. 217). They further argue
that the tourism policy network is dominated by government, which strategically directs
policy, with sub-networks applying resources to generate collaborations with government
bureaucracy and decision makers (2001, pp. 244–245). Pforr (2005, p. 336) uses a
network approach to place the focus on ‘the participants in the policy-making process,
their relationships as well as the structural context in which these take place’. More radi-
cally however, Pforr (2005) argues for a combination of Easton’s (1965) policy system
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with policy cycle and policy network models to create a process-oriented model of policy-
making that recognises and captures the complexity of influential factors such as policy
environment, time horizons and the importance of public and private sector actors in the
process.
These studies all provide considerable insights into the policy environment and the
engagements of networks within that environment, outlining in detail how those relation-
ships function. However a general criticism of the networks approach is that it tends to
be descriptive rather than explanatory. Moreover, although Pforr’s (2005) analysis does
much to address the complexity of policy-making, his study is less focused on the issue
of policy implementation, which is dealt with in a mainly descriptive way, by detailing
the phase of implementation as part of the policy cycle, but the framework does not
explain what political factors or players determine the implementation of policy. Thus,
analysis of tourism policy-making to date successfully recognises and captures the com-
plexity of influential network factors but, with the exception of Dodds (2007), they under-
specify the exact manner in which agencies engage to generate development outcomes, or
as Pforr (2005, p. 338) puts it ‘how exactly the political system transfers inputs into
outputs’. They do not fully explore how politics influences not just policy-making but
also implementation. Thus, the politics underlying the interactions of the state and
private sector within development strategy can be further interrogated and it is to the exam-
ination of that issue that this paper is directed.
The developmental state: constructing institutional capacity
If the gaps in the tourism literature outlined above are to be addressed then the debate needs
to engage with a literature that has comprehensively examined the state’s role in economic
development. Economic sociologists have outlined the manner in which states affect devel-
opmental performance. The main claim made is that the power of the developmental state is
dependent on its relationship with the private sector as well as on its own institutional
capacity to effectively promote development (Johnson, 1982). Thus, a number of state-
structural theories emphasise the impact of the state’s structure and its actions on policy,
but they do not ‘insist on the autonomy of the state vis-a`-vis societal pressure. Instead
they accord interest groups, political parties, and other actors outside the state an important
role in the policy process’ (Hall, 1993, p. 276). The key insight for understanding tourism
development is that states’ roles in development are determined by the institutional nature
of the state (Evans, 1995; Onis, 1991; Wade, 1990). Two linked features of the state under-
pin this institutional element of state development capacity. Firstly, a degree of bureaucratic
autonomy and secondly, institutional links across public and private sectors (Onis, 1991).
The coexistence of an independent bureaucracy and links between the public and private
sectors means that the state and bureaucratic elites can develop independent national
goals and translate these broad national goals into effective development action (Onis,
1991). Evans explains this combination in terms of ‘embedded autonomy’ where the
state achieves autonomy by channelling the bureaucracy to the pursuit of developmental
goals, but the state is also ‘embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to
society and provide institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotia-
tion of goals and policies’ (Evans, 1995, p. 59). It is this capacity for institutional configur-
ation that explains why some societies have been more successful than others in achieving
growth (Evans, 1995, 1997; Sabel, 1994; Smelser & Swedberg, 2005).
The state developmental literature addresses not only the bureaucratic aspects of state
capacity but also examines the manner in which coalitions are constructed and maintained
566 A. O’Brien
across the state and commercial classes. Thus, the concept ‘developmental state’ means that
the public and private sides use each other in a mutually beneficial relationship in order to
achieve developmental goals. When the developmental state is working well, it is a ‘cataly-
tic’ and networked agency and the business class respond to incentives and disincentives that
the state establishes. ‘This is not an easy combination to put together, but when it is done
properly, it can produce miracles of economic development’ (Woo-Cummings, 1999,
p. 60). Thus, if state developmentalism is centrally determined by the state’s capacity to gen-
erate institutional configurations it becomes important to clearly outline what is meant by an
institution. Various institutionalists distinguish among institutional dimensions from within
particular paradigms (Campbell, 2004) but typically institutions are understood to comprise
formal and informal dimensions or to comprise regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive
pillars (North, 1990, 1998; Orren & Skowronek, 1994). However, there is little consensus
on connecting these dimensions to any particular definition of an institution. Wilson
(2000) draws on an international and regulatory regime literature (Doughterty & Pfaltzgraff,
1997; Espang-Anderson, 1993; Harris &Milkis, 1996; Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1997) in order
to propose that policy regimes comprise four dimensions: Power arrangements, which
‘entails the presence of one or more powerful interest groups supporting the policy
regime’ and which may occur in many different patterns (Wilson, 2000, p. 257); Policy para-
digm, which is the ideology or set of assumptions that shapes the way that problems are per-
ceived or defined, the types of solutions offered and the kinds of policy proposed (Gusfield,
1981); Organisations, as they exists within government, within policymaking arrangements
and within the implementation structure; Policy goals which both embody the goals of the
policy regime and entails the ‘rules and routines of the implementing agency’ (Wilson, 2000,
p. 258). Wilson’s definition of policy regimes can be used to understand the dimensions of
institutions. Thus, institutions are defined here, as regimes comprised of the four dimensions
of policy paradigms, policy goals, power arrangements and organisations. Determining how
the developmental state influences tourism development becomes a matter of examining the
institutional configuration that is constructed, at these various dimensional levels, around the
development project.
Methodology
The article draws on a case study analysis conducted between 2004 and 2006. Case studies
attempt to provide a multi-dimensional picture of the case and are useful in explorations of
relationships, patterns of influence, and micro-political issues (Yin, 1989). Within the case
study a grounded theory approach (Glasser & Strauss, 1967) was used to guide the data col-
lection, to create conceptual categories, to manage the data analysis, to demonstrate
relationships between conceptual categories and to develop the theoretical framework
(Charmaz, 2003, p. 311). The timeframe delineation of the case was the period between
1987 and 2007. This particular 20-year period was chosen because Irish tourism underwent
significant and consistent year-on-year growth over this timeframe, from a base number of
tourism arrivals at 2.4 million, and revenue earnings of £1153 million (E1459 million) to
arrivals of 7.7 million, and revenue earnings of E6.45 billion. Data were collected through
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with key players. The interviews were
conducted with a sample of eight key players in government departments, state agencies,
and private sector organisations concerned with tourism development. The sample was col-
lated through preliminary interviews with informants who were incumbents in senior pos-
itions in leading state and private sector organisations. These initial interviews explored
participants’ opinions and accounts of tourism development. On that basis further topics
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and questions emerged and other potential interviewees were named and these avenues
were subsequently pursued in further interviews. In this way, the data collection was
very much focused on a key cohort who were at the centre of the development process.
Three further interviews were sought but declined due to illness. Those interviewed
included: Michael McNulty, former Director General of Bord Fa´ilte; Paddy Teahon,
former Secretary General in the Department of An Taoiseach; a senior civil servant from
Department of Tourism; Paul O’ Toole, Chief Executive of Tourism Ireland; John Power,
Chief Executive of the Irish Hotels Federation (IHF); Jim Flannery, former Chief Executive
of the IHF; Brendan Leahy and Eileen O’ Mara-Walsh, former Chief Executives of the Irish
Tourism Industry Confederation (ITIC). The sampling process produced a small cohort of
interviewees but all persons named by key players as relevant were approached, moreover
the resultant data were derived from state, semi-state and private sector organisations and in
this regard were both balanced and representative.
The manner in which the semi-structured interviews were conducted allowed for flexible
and adaptable means of data collection, enabling follow-up questions on interesting lines of
inquiry, and allowed for a greater understanding of nuances and context. Interviews were
taped and transcribed later. Interviews generated both agreements and contradictions
about tourism’s development, which further qualified and enriched both the document-
based information and the overall qualitative argument. The grounded theory approach to
the processmeant that as data emerged it was analysed and initial accounts were further inter-
rogated during subsequent field interviews. In this way, the analytic incisiveness of the resul-
tant analysis was strengthened. The generalisation to theory from interview data was further
underpinned by very extensive documentary analysis, which incorporated all official and
archival state documents relating to tourism development in Ireland since the foundation
of the state, all organisational records that were available through libraries, databases or
directly from organisation’s archives, annual reports, policy reports and papers from both
public and private sector tourism organisations and legislative documents. Issues of authen-
ticity were unproblematic as most documents were deposited in state archives, but there were
some concerns around the issue of representativeness as some private sector organisations
were less inclined to archive documents than state agencies. Throughout the analysis of
the documents, issues of form, structure, content and potential absences were brought to
bear and documents were read as manifestations of the ideologies underpinning their
source organisations. The interview and documentary data were organised across a time-
ordered matrix of the sector’s development between the late 1970s and 2007 and categorised
according to their origin. Patterns and regularities as well as contradictions emerged as the
data were coded, which posited a structure for the overall analysis. The findings from the
documentary data were checked against interview data for correlations, verifications or dis-
parities. The data analysis thus moved between descriptions of events that underpinned the
creation of development strategies and the classification of these events into themes and cat-
egories, which were then coded in relation to the theoretical framework outlined. The resul-
tant, detailed case study analysis of the political economy of the growth of Irish tourism,
incorporating a developmental state perspective, is outlined below.
The Irish case
Between 1987 and 2007 Irish tourism grew significantly from tourism arrivals of 2.4
million, with 69,000 people employed, to a peak of tourism arrivals of 7.7 million, with
322,000 people employed. This growth was facilitated by the creation of an institutional
developmental regime between the Irish State and the private sector, which radically
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transformed the power arrangements, the policy paradigm and organisational structures of
the sector, resulting in the successful generation and implementation of radical policy
goals for the sector. The remainder of this article outlines the manner in which this insti-
tutional development regime was constructed by the various political coalitions involved
in the sector and notes the factors that impacted upon both the generation and implementation
of the tourism development strategy. The institutional regime concerned with the develop-
ment of Irish tourism began to change in the late 1970s at an organisational level, when
the most dominant of the tourism organisations at the time, the IHF1 was consolidated
under the directorship of a new chief executive, who had been recruited from the state
national tourism agency, Bord Fa´ilte. Change within the IHF was further underpinned by
the creation of a new, networked organisation to represent the industry, the ITIC.2 These
organisations initiated a shift in thinking on the potential of the tourism industry for econ-
omic development, which resulted in the creation of an organisational alliance with the domi-
nant conservative political party, Fianna Fa´il (ITIC, 1989). Following the election of that
party to parliament, the power arrangements underpinning tourism development changed
fundamentally. With the Taoiseach3 and his government department acting as a champion
for tourism development, the state tourism agency was redirected into a partnership-style
engagement with the private sector. Further organisational changes resulted in the generation
of radical policy and targets for growth. Stationery Office, 1988, 1989, 1999. The advent
of EU structural funds for tourism development, and the bureaucratic procedures that
accompanied the funds, led to the highly efficient implementation of the targets for
growth. Thus, because of changes in the institutional regime concerned with tourism devel-
opment, that is: changes in the organisational network, in the power arrangements, changes
in understandings of the economic importance and benefits to be derived from tourism, and
changes in tourism policy generation and implementation practices, the entire institutional
basis of tourism development was radically altered, which contributed to the creation of a
state developmental project that was highly effective in generating growth.
Organisational change and policy paradigm shifts
The genesis of change originated within the IHF, when in 1978 they appointed a new chief
executive with a remit to consolidate the organisation. Also in the early 1980s O’ Mara
Walsh, founded a new industry network ITIC, which aimed to consolidate and unite the
entire private sector. As Brendan Leahy, former Chief Executive of ITIC notes about the
organisation at that time:
What I felt was that we needed an industry that speaks with a single voice, so that if there
are any statements being issued on tourism and dealings with government it goes through
one body . . . the only hope that you have of holding people together on a single voice on
policies is to keep at a strategic level . . .. ITIC got together in the early 1980s with a pretty
good constitution and deliberately kept the focus on national policy rather than trade
difficulties . . . if you come together to form a strong group you can influence policy . . . .
The second thing was that a policy must be industry led, in other words if a policy emerged
and we weren’t consulted we would say sorry the industry isn’t part of this . . . The third
thing was that the industry should participate in national structures. That’s terribly important.
(Leahy)
By 1986, the IHF was adequately consolidated as an organisation to turn its attention to
the fundamental underlying problem for the sector – inadequate growth. As Flannery, the
IHF Chief Executive notes ‘There wasn’t enough growth to sustain the hotel sector and it
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really wasn’t going anywhere’. This realisation essentially initiated a shift amongst the private
sector in the key vision or policy paradigm that underpinned the sector.While the IHF held the
rotating chairmanship of ITIC in 1986 it commissioned a study into the possibility of doubling
tourism numbers and revenue Stokes, Peat, and Davy, 1986. Flannery recounts:
The question we put to the consultants to find out for us was could Ireland’s tourism double in
five years? . . . The response was yes the market could yield this . . . One of the primary impe-
diments was access and the cost of access. But the financial return on the jobs creation would be
much greater than a similar investment in agriculture or in manufacturing . . . (Flannery)
The findings of this report led to a fundamental shift in the state’s ideological position
on tourism development when one political party in particular responded positively to the
report. Flannery explains the IHF’s strategy for approaching the state apparatus with its
proposal. Late in 1986 a general election had been called:
John Bruton was leading Fine Gael, Dessie O’ Malley was leading the Progressive Democrats,
MacGiolla was leading Labour, and Charlie Haughey was leading Fianna Fa´il. We took the
report outcome to all of them . . . The Labour Party disappointed us . . .. Dessie O’ Malley
attacked us for not attacking Aer Lingus . . . Charlie was the one that had the positive response.
He said ‘Could I make it a plank in the manifesto?’ We said ok it’s your platform. So he ran
with it. (Flannery)4
Flannery further notes ‘Fortunately they were elected and John Wilson became Minister
for Tourism and was instructed by the Taoiseach to get on with it’. The outcome was a
report Putting growth back into tourism, which outlined the new Fianna Fa´il government’s
thinking on tourism development. The report noted that ‘Revitalising tourism must be a top
national priority’ (Fianna Fa´il, 1987, p. 3).
Thus a new institutional configuration focused on tourism development had begun to
emerge because a cooperative interlock had been created at an organisational level
between the IHF and Fianna Fa´il. This connection led to a further fundamental shift in
how the state perceived tourism’s potential for economic development and growth. The
role of two key players, Flannery and Haughey, in the creation of the initial organisational
connection is significant. Aldrich (1999) and Kingdon (1995) have referred to such key
individuals as institutional entrepreneurs and have proposed that they are normally respon-
sible for recombining institutional elements in innovative ways. However, the conceptual-
isation of institutional regimes outlined here proposes that the main importance of these
individuals is not only their individual entrepreneurial characteristics but also their position
within the dimensions of an institutional regime and their roles in creating connections
between the public and private sides of the development regime. Thus, the entrepreneurial
qualities of the Taoiseach and the Chief Executive of the IHF were both central to change
within tourism development, but not only because they were tourism ‘champions’ but rather
because of their positions within the structures of the institutional regime, which facilitated
the creation of new connections between the public and private sectors, which led to change
in the tourism development strategy.
Changing power arrangements
The paradigm shift within the new government resulted in a further shift in the power
arrangements within the sector. The private sector was increasingly included in policy
creation and implementation. The state responded officially to recommendations made
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by an industry association in The national development plan 1988–1992. Moreover, the
Department of An Taoiseach responded rapidly and significantly to inadequacies and ten-
sions in the state tourism agency. In effect the central government consolidated its role as
the generator of tourism policy and extended the level of involvement of the private sector,
namely ITIC and IHF, to partnership status. Concurrently, Bord Fa´ilte was increasingly
relegated to the role of coordinator for all regional and local bodies. This shift in emphasis
resulted in a radical reappraisal of state organisations involved in tourism and in particular
Bord Fa´ilte’s role in the tourism sector. O’Mara Walsh notes that ITIC met with some resist-
ance from Bord Fa´ilte:
You had Bord Fa´ilte and Bord Fa´ilte would have seen themselves as representing the industry,
but it was a state agency . . . and to a degree also at the time it was fairly autocratic . . . They saw
themselves as the patrons, the Godfathers . . . (O’Mara Walsh)
The changes in private sector tourism organisations, the power arrangements surround-
ing them and the state’s ideological shift in its approach to tourism development caused
fundamental alterations in the state’s role in tourism development, which significantly
impacted upon the policy goals for tourism development, and their implementation,
which also centrally involved the EU. The Irish State negotiated with the European Com-
mission a very significant and fully costed strategy for the development of tourism, which
resulted in the Operational Programme for Tourism 1989–1993. The advent of EU funding
for tourism development had a profound influence on the development of the sector but also
on the political coalition underpinning the sector’s rapid growth. As McNulty notes, EU
funding was:
. . . A key element because without that we would never have been able to get the product right.
Government could have given us more money for marketing and so forth but that would not
have built the foundation for the industry properly. So the EU Funds were critically important.
(McNulty)
However, the administrative structures required by the funds also played a role in con-
solidating new state-private sector power arrangements for tourism. Leahy explains ITIC’s
role in the distribution of funding:
As part of the structural funds you had to have a consultant committee within the industry and
ITIC had four people on that. So we had an industry sitting around the table and it monitored
the distribution of the structural funds from tourism under the aegis of the Department and
Brussels . . . So we had a very good influence on how the funds were being applied to
tourism . . . It was monitored by the Department of Tourism . . . and the Brussels people
would attend all the meetings and would say their concerns and would make sure that the
funds were directed in compliance with the EU regulations . . . and then the EU would bring
in consultants and evaluate after a year, year-and-a-half because it was dealing with targets.
You had to get tourism growth, you had to get quality, you had to get regional distribution
of tourism and all sorts of things. But it was a very good forum for case making, for how to
direct funds to the benefit of the industry. I think if the industry wasn’t there funds would
still be distributed but they wouldn’t have the same impact . . . The whole European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) funds for tourism was a tremendous success because it leveraged
an enormous investment on the private sector side even though it provided the seed money, it
provided the incentive, it leveraged the investment . . . (Leahy)
Commenting on the impact of the funding structures on the power arrangements and
relations between state agencies and the private sector, Leahy further notes:
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We became involved in the ERDF committee and with the Department. We were in partnership
with them on that committee and then we would work with them in between meetings. To be
fair the Department were quite receptive after a while . . . But I think the Tourist Board saw the
emergence of ITIC as an erosion of their influence both with the department and within industry
and certainly watched what ITIC were doing very carefully and they were members of ITIC
which was quite interesting . . . I think the tension would come first of all because of the
fact that memberships of Bord Fa´ilte were all political appointments. The government of the
day always appoints all of Bord Fa´ilte . . . generally people were put on because they were
pro-party . . . Tension would emerge more in petty ways . . . They were losing their status as
a planning body. (Leahy)
From Bord Fa´ilte’s perspective the ERDF committees were challenging as organis-
ational partnerships. As McNulty comments:
You do have to establish that level of trust, because the private sector sometimes do not trust the
government sector and vice versa. They see things from different perspectives so it takes, in my
view, years to get that aligned so that there is a reasonable view by both sides . . . When the
ERDF partnerships were formed I made a rule indicating that no person from the tourist
board or public sector could chair any of them. So they were all chaired by the private
sector . . . and this caused quite a lot of aggravation obviously for me because our people
didn’t like that because the opposite would have happened before. (McNulty)
The co-operation generated by the ERDF structures signalled a new departure in state
agency and industry power relations, which came to be characterised as genuinely open net-
works between government departments, state agencies, and private sector organisations.
For the IHF:
The coming of the Operational Programme for Tourism . . . was when we broke down this
barrier of ‘them and us’. And since then there has been a willingness to continue this,
pushed by the government; and the Ministers wanted it, they wanted industry onboard and
the industry got more organised too in a sense . . . and we’re still very much involved in the
lobbying issues; we have various policy inputs into things like National Development Plans;
we would be strongly represented on the boards of Tourism Ireland and Fa´ilte Ireland.5 We
would have ongoing dialogue with the department, the department work very closely with
us now, there was a time when they didn’t want to see you. Now nothing happens but
they’re talking about it. (Power)
For Bord Fa´ilte the success of the project also generated a change in agency – industry
relations:
Once we achieved success in terms of getting 15% growth for the first 2 years, the industry then
really became much more engaged because now they could see the confidence and trust in the
whole process and leadership and in their own ability which was growing all the time . . . and
we were helping them at all those stages because no matter how good you are as a tourist board,
you can never equal the capacity of the industry so you have to get the industry working with
you. (McNulty)
Thus the state used the EU funding programmes to further ‘define’ and discipline both
industry and its own tourism organisations and to centralise the state’s development agenda.
The tendency to lead Bord Fa´ilte into increased interlock with the private sector was
further underscored with the establishment of the National Tourism Council in 1993,
which served to formally include the commercial sector in policy negotiations and to act
in a briefing capacity to the Minister. Again in 1994 the government, and not the state
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agency, set the industry growth targets in the Second Operational Programme for Tourism
1994–1999. This plan proposed to achieve foreign earnings of (IR)£2250 million and to
create a further 35,000 jobs (Stationery Office, 1994, p. 5). Bord Fa´ilte’s role in tourism
in general became increasingly defined as an implementation body but also more limited
in the early years of the 2000s. By 2002, Tourism Ireland Ltd. took over from Bord
Fa´ilte the responsibility for Tourism Brand Ireland and the marketing of the island of
Ireland overseas.6 In May 2003, the Tourism Traffic Act 2003 established Fa´ilte Ireland
as the new national tourism development authority, however the agency was limited to pro-
viding support services for the industry across a number of areas such as research, recruit-
ment, education, and professional development. In the marketing area, Fa´ilte Ireland was to
promote only domestic tourism and was to work in association with Tourism Ireland Ltd. on
the international market. By 2003, the only body directly responsible for tourism policy was
the government, with the Minister directly advised by private sector organisations. The state
became increasingly embedded in the tourism industry at an institutional level during the
late 1980s and early 1990s by weakening the hegemony of Bord Fa´ilte and by facilitating
the private sector in accessing the policy-making process. Thus, in the late 1980s and 1990s
the institutional landscape of the tourism sector was radically altered from a state-led, pater-
nalistic, top-down approach to a co-operative, networked and interlocked approach which
realised the instigation and implementation of a new development strategy.
New policy goals
Growth targets were increasingly ambitious and outcomes equally impressive. The depar-
ture point for a change in policy goals for the tourism industry had occurred with the first
statement of specific targets for growth in the Programme for National Recovery in 1987,
which proposed the doubling of tourism earnings and the creation of 25,000 jobs (Station-
ery Office, 1987). The following national development strategy, the Programme for Econ-
omic and Social Progress, in 1990 set targets for growth for 1991–1993 at an increase in
visitor numbers from 1.4 to 4.5 million with the creation of 15,000 jobs (Stationery Office,
1990, p. 48). These targets were met and superseded in the Second Operational Programme
for Tourism 1994–1998 which proposed to create a further 35,000 jobs, as well as extend
the tourism season and improve the quality of service through training (Stationery Office,
1994, p. 5). The Tourism Development Strategy 2000–2006 set targets for 9 million tourist
trips (Bord Fa´ilte, 2000). By 2003 tourism was generating 4.4% of GNP and supporting
140,000 jobs (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2003; Fa´ilte Ireland, 2003). The
final report of the Tourism Action Plan Implementation Group in 2006 noted, ‘. . . the stat-
istics speak for themselves. The tourism industry provides direct employment for almost
150,000 workers. In 2005, it attracted 6.7 million overseas visitors. This level of foreign
revenue earnings is equivalent to half the value of exports by all Irish-owned manufacturing
companies’ (Stationery Office, 2006, p. 1). By 2007, 20 years after the first change in the
development regime, tourism arrivals were 7.7 million, the industry employed 322,000
people and revenue earnings from tourism were E6.45 billion (Fa´ilte Ireland, 2007). The
Irish tourism industry had been transformed as a result of the creation of a highly effective
state development institutional regime.
Conclusion
A key contribution made by this article is that its development state perspective moves
beyond current tendencies in the tourism literature to examine the interactions of the
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state and the business class in terms of public–private partnerships (Davis et al., 1993; Hall,
2008) or networks (Pforr, 2005). The problem with approaching the interface of these
parties in terms of partnership is that while it serves to describe the arrangement very
well, it does not expose how the relationships are created, nor how the relationships func-
tion, nor do they adequately link to an explanation of how partnership actually generates or
implements development strategies. As a response to this problem, the study focuses on an
alternative conceptualisation of the interaction between the government and industry, which
it frames in terms of the interlock of multi-dimensional regimes. This new understanding
explores state and private sector interactions at the levels of organisations, power arrange-
ments, policy paradigms and goals. The multi-level conceptualisation of the state, industry
and their interactions offers scope to understand at a macro level not only how a state and
private sector interlock is initially created but also how it functions to facilitate policy gen-
eration and implementation in a more detailed, complex or multi-dimensional way than the
partnership approach, which accepts partnership as a somewhat unproblematic descriptive
category. Nonetheless, although the framing of the state and private sectors as regimes, and
their interactions in terms of interlock is a useful progression of the debate around state and
business interactions for development, nonetheless there is scope for further exploration of
the political process and practices involved in creating interlocks, at both meso- and micro-
levels.
Furthermore, while some of the complexity of the interactions between state and
business coalitions within development projects has been discussed in the tourism litera-
ture, through a networks approach to tourism development, this study builds upon that ana-
lytic approach. This article incorporates a general acceptance of tourism development as a
networked phenomenon but the main departure from the network approach is at the level of
explanation. Rather than simply describing the existence of a developmental network this
study explores instead the manner in which the network, or rather interlock, of developmen-
tal regimes was created. Thus, it explores the origins of interlocks across the dimensions of
policy paradigms, organisations, power structures and policy goals, and explores the
manner in which connections between the state and industry are created through interlocks,
which act as the equivalent of nodal points on a network. Thus, while this study recognises
that developmental programmes are networked it conceptualises the networks differently, as
institutional regimes. In this way, the study adds named dimensions to understandings of
networks and focuses on the points at which interconnection occurs in order to explain
the origins and functions of the regime connections rather than merely describing them.
Moreover, the article moves beyond the current tendency in the literature to limit analyses
of tourism partnerships or networks to the policy-making process, in so far as this study also
examines policy implementation. Dodds (2007, p. 297) emphasises that ‘research on the
implementation of tourism policy is weak’ and there are ‘multiple needs for research on
this topic’. While Dodds usefully addresses the implementation of policy at local level,
this study addresses the issue at national level. Moreover, it focuses on generating some
conceptualisations of the institutional aspects of policy implementation. This study
names the regimes and the dimensions through which the state and industry engage on
policy implementation. The implications for further research in this regard are numerous,
most particularly this framework could be applied across other cases of tourism develop-
ment to understand the extent to which the frameworks generalisations are valid beyond
the limitations of the Irish case.
This article demonstrates that a development state approach has much to offer with
respect to generating frameworks for understanding tourism development. With regard to
the Irish tourism literature and the developmental state literature, this study challenges
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both. The Irish tourism ‘boom’ is usually explained in terms of the liberalisation of access to
Ireland and the advent of EU structural funds but these factors were both mediated through
state decisions and thus the paper highlights the need to acknowledge and explore states’
roles in tourism development more thoroughly. With regard to the developmental state lit-
erature, the study elaborates a new theoretical approach to the politics of developmental
change, which invokes interlocking regimes as a conceptualisation of state and private
sector interactions. This approach avoids the development literature’s tendency to reify
these variables and challenges institutional analysts to examine the mechanisms of
change more thoroughly at the level the state and industry interactions. Similarly, the
research highlights the fact that developmental state theorists have somewhat neglected
service sector industries in general and tourism in particular, despite the fact that it has
been a global growth sector. The study makes the case for placing continued emphasis
on a more rigorous analysis of the institutional politics of tourism development.
Notes
1. The Irish IHF is the national organisation of the hotel and guesthouse industry.
2. ITIC is a representative body for the industry and focuses on the economic development of
tourism.
3. An Taoiseach is the Irish prime minister.
4. Fine Gael describes itself as a political party of the ‘progressive centre’. Progressive Democrats
were a free market liberal party, dissolved in 2009. Labour Party is a democratic socialist and
social democratic party. Fianna Fail has been the dominant party in Ireland since the 1930s.
Aer Lingus is the national airline.
5. Tourism Ireland coordinates with Fa´ilte Ireland in the Republic and the Northern Ireland Tourist
Board on product development and marketing.
6. Tourism Brand Ireland is a destination branding strategy managed by Tourism Ireland.
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